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Abstract— Vehicular Networks (VNs) are emerging, among
civilian applications, as a convincing instantiation of the mobile
networking technology. However, security is a critical factor and
a significant challenge to be met. Misbehaving or faulty network
nodes have to be detected and prevented from disrupting network
operation, a problem particularly hard to address in the life-
critical VN environment. Existing networks rely mainly on node
certificate revocation for attacker eviction, but the lack of an
omnipresent infrastructure in VNs may unacceptably delay the
retrieval of the most recent and relevant revocation information;
this will especially be the case in the early deployment stages
of such a highly volatile and large-scale system. In this paper,
we address this specific problem. We propose protocols, as
components of a framework, for the identification and local
containment of misbehaving or faulty nodes, and then for their
eviction from the system. We tailor our design to the VN
characteristics and analyze our system. Our results show that
the distributed approach to contain nodes and contribute to their
eviction is efficiently feasible and achieves a sufficient level of
robustness.
Index Terms— vehicular networks, misbehavior detection, cer-
tificate revocation
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENT research initiatives supported by governmentsand car manufacturers seek to enhance the safety and
efficiency of transportation systems. Vehicular networks lie
at the core of these efforts. Vehicular network nodes, that
is, vehicles and Road-Side infrastructure Units (RSUs) will
be equipped with sensing, processing, and wireless commu-
nication modules. Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure (V2I) communication will enable safety applica-
tions that provide warnings about accidents, traffic conditions
(e.g., congestion, emergency braking) and other events.
Integrating security mechanisms into the VNs is critical
for their deployment: their rich functionality and services
can be otherwise abused, jeopardizing the safety of vehicles,
drivers, and passengers, as well as the efficiency of the
transportation system. A number of research contributions an-
alyze vulnerabilities [1], [2], outline architectural components,
requirements, and design principles [3], and propose specific
mechanisms [4], [5], [6], [7], [8].
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The presence of an authority, which we denote as the Certi-
fication Authority (CA), is implied or mandated in practically
all the research efforts concerned with securing VNs. Rigid
identity and credential management processes for vehicles and
drivers have long been in place; accountability and attribution
of liability will continue to be crucial; and access control
mechanisms will be necessary. Without the appropriate cer-
tificates and cryptographic keys, nodes are essentially unable
to participate in the network operation. Nevertheless, the pos-
session of a certificate does not guarantee that its holder will
provide correct information: a node can simply inject faulty
data (e.g., alerts, warnings, coordinates) while complying with
the implemented protocols. Safeguarding the system against
such faulty or compromised nodes is crucial for its robustness.
Hence the need for the eviction of misbehaving nodes. A
typical approach for achieving this is the revocation of node
certificates; once this is done, messages from these nodes will
be ignored.
Timely access to revocation information is a particularly
hard problem in VNs. The road-side infrastructure can act
as the gateway of the CA to the network, distributing the
latest Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) [9]. The lack of
an omnipresent road-side infrastructure, especially in the early
deployment stages, and the huge scale of the VNs are obstacles
to the application of traditional certificate revocation schemes.
Moreover, unless a node is revoked for administrative reasons
(e.g., the vehicle owner did not renew its registration), how can
the authority obtain and validate sufficient evidence that a node
is faulty or compromised? Thus, an additional challenge is
how non-misbehaving nodes can be protected until they obtain
the revocation information regarding misbehaving nodes.
Our contributions in this paper address these problems. We
propose the combination of (i) infrastructure-based revocation
protocols, the Revocation of the Trusted Component (RTC)
and Revocation using Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists
(RC2RL), (ii) a Misbehavior Detection System (MDS) en-
abling the neighbors of a misbehaving or faulty node to detect
its deviation from normal behavior, and initiate (iii) a Local
Eviction of Attackers by Voting Evaluators (LEAVE) protocol
to safeguard the system operation, until the attacker is revoked
by the CA, partially or fully based on the evidence LEAVE
provides.
We emphasize however that no group of nodes has the
power to revoke another node. The CA is the sole entity with
the right to initiate a revocation protocol. This design choice
ensures resilience to collusion attacks, retains accountability,
and yet equips nodes with a rapid reaction and self-protection
tool. Indeed, our performance evaluation results show that a
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high percentage of the attacker’s neighbors can be alerted of
its misbehavior, despite the very short contact time between
the protocol participants.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first
describe the system and adversary models in Sec. II. We
provide an overview of our scheme in Sec. III and then present
its components in further detail in Sections IV-VI. We evaluate
our scheme in Sec. VII. We survey related work in Sec. VIII,
before we conclude.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Drawing from the analogy with existing administrative
processes and automotive authorities (e.g., city or state transit
authorities), a large number of CAs will exist. Each of them
is responsible for the identity management of all vehicles
registered in its region (national territory, district, county,
etc.). Vehicles are registered with exactly one CA. Each node
has a unique identity V and a pair of private and public
cryptographic keys, PrKV and PuKV , respectively, and is
equipped with a certificate CertCA{V, PuKV } issued by the
CA. The vehicle may have several keys for privacy reasons
[7] but this does not affect the operation of the proposed
mechanisms (because revocation and eviction apply actually
to the keys of a vehicle) and is out of scope of this paper.
Messages are transmitted periodically, e.g., every 0.3 s for
safety messages, or triggered by in-vehicle or network events.
Most of the traffic is broadcasted to limited regions of the
network; these regions are determined by the corresponding
applications. All safety-related messages include the time and
geographical coordinates (obtained by a positioning service,
such as the widely available GPS) of the sender, in addition
to other application-specific information. In addition, each
message is signed and accompanied by the sender’s certificate.
The feasibility of asymmetric cryptography, namely digital
signatures, in VNs, has been shown in prior work [10].
Safety messages that need to propagate across multiple hops
(and perhaps have the originator’s signature, coordinates and
time intact as they propagate) are signed and include the
coordinates and timestamp of the last relaying node. This
ensures the freshness of the information and limits the propa-
gation of illegitimate information. A received safety message
is discarded if the difference between its timestamp and the
timestamp of the receiver is larger than a system-specific con-
stant that accounts for the maximum clock drift and one-hop
transmission, propagation and processing delays. Moreover,
a message is discarded (at a receiver) if the coordinates of
its sender/relay, as reported in the message, indicate that the
receiver is outside the sender’s maximum nominal wireless
communication range (accounting for location information
inaccuracies). This validation is applied only on a per-hop
manner.
At the data link layer, the Dedicated Short Range Commu-
nications (DSRC) protocol [11], currently being standardized
as IEEE 802.11p, provides transmission ranges of typically
300 to 1000 m, with data rates in the 6-27 Mbps range. In
this paper, we assume that 802.11p is used, unless noted
otherwise. Beyond DSRC, vehicular networks can leverage
on other wireless communication technologies, such as the
(licensed-frequency) existing cellular networks, broadband
wireless (e.g., WiMax), or low-speed radio broadcast systems
used today for traffic information.
We denote a subset of the network nodes as the infras-
tructure, comprising the RSUs (i.e., short-range DSRC base
stations) and mobile units. The latter include public safety
vehicles (e.g., highway assistance and fire-fighting vehicles),
police vehicles, aerial vehicles (e.g., police helicopters), and
public transport vehicles (e.g., buses, trams). In our context,
these nodes can be used, for example, to disseminate CRLs.
Infrastructure nodes serve as the gateway of the CA to/from
the VN; the connection of the CA to the static infrastructure
nodes is over wireline secure links. We note however that
accessibility of the CA from the VN is not assumed to be
guaranteed at all times.
Many vehicles are already equipped with hardware and
firmware components, such as speed limiters, tachographs,
and event data recorders (EDRs), which are considered crit-
ical by manufacturers and legislators. We assume that nodes
are equipped with a Trusted Component (TC), i.e., tamper-
resistant hardware and firmware. The role of the TC is two-
fold: (i) it stores all cryptographic material and prevents its
exposure to the on-board computer; (ii) it performs all cryp-
tographic operations. This assumption, although seemingly
strong, has been previously justified in the context of VNs
[7]. In addition, recent advances in TC design [12] suggest that
sufficiently performing, yet reasonable priced, devices will be
available on the market.
A. Adversary Model
We term as an adversary or attacker any node that deviates
from the legitimate VN protocols. Nodes can also be faulty
due to failures of their equipment. A detailed discussion of
adversary and fault models is given in [3]. Any of these
attacks or faults, or combinations thereof, can affect the
VN-enabled applications. We also refer to adversaries as
misbehaving nodes. As our proposed mechanisms apply to
both misbehaving and faulty nodes, we will use both terms
interchangeably in the remainder of this paper without losing
the generality of the solutions.
In addition, the information-oriented operation of VNs, with
their diverse data types, makes false information dissemination
a very effective attack, compared to deviations from the
networking protocols. In fact, it would suffice for an adversary
to manipulate the sensory inputs rather than compromise the
protocol stack and the computing platform [3]. It is also
possible that an attacker controls incoming communication,
i.e., selectively erasing messages received by its on-board
platform.
We emphasize that we are concerned with misbehaving
nodes equipped with valid credentials, because they can
effectively abuse the system. An essential assumption we
make is the existence of an honest majority in the attacker’s
neighborhood (defined in Sec. VI-B). As we will show later,
this allows vehicles to rely on their honest neighbors in order
to evict attackers. This assumption (also elaborated in [13],
[3]) may appear limiting; but it is reasonable if we consider
the existing transportation systems where the actual percentage
of attackers is very low.
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Fig. 1. Detection and Eviction Scheme Overview.
III. SCHEME OVERVIEW
Our scheme consists of the following basic components:
(i) the centralized revocation of a node by the CA, (ii) the
local detection of misbehavior, performed individually by each
node and (iii) a distributed, localized protocol for the eviction
of an attacker by its neighboring nodes. The scheme with its
components is illustrated in Fig. 1.
We propose two methods for misbehaving node revocation,
initiated by the CA. The first one, RTC (Revocation of the
TC, described in Sec. IV-A), leverages on the presence of
a TC unit on board the vehicle. The CA determines that a
vehicle V must be revoked and, with the help of the road-side
infrastructure, initiates a two-party end-to-end protocol with
TCV , the trusted component of V . The CA instructs the TC
to erase all cryptographic material (e.g., keys) it stores and halt
its operation upon completion of the protocol. Essentially, this
protocol “kills” the TC, depriving the misbehaving node from
its cryptographic keys, and thus ensuring that all its messages
are ignored by all other correct nodes.
However, RTC is not robust against a sophisticated adver-
sary that controls the communication link between the CA
and the TC. If the CA fails in executing RTC (detected by the
lack of an acknowledgment), it will revert to the distribution
of the revocation information, namely, a CRL, to the VN.
This way, the CA invalidates credentials before the end of
their lifetime. But the size of CRLs will grow with the size
of the VN and hence is not scalable. To adapt this approach
to the VN scale, we propose the RC2RL (Revocation using
Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists) protocol (Sec. IV-
B), with Compressed CRLs (C2RLs) being shorter than tradi-
tional CRLs by means of Bloom filter compression.
The timely and efficient distribution of revocation infor-
mation across the VN is the primary means of revoking
misbehaving nodes. However, to design a robust and efficient
system capable of progressively isolating misbehaving nodes
before this information becomes available, we propose the use
of a localized MDS (Misbehavior Detection System) and the
LEAVE (Local Eviction of Attackers by Voting Evaluators)
protocol.
MDS, discussed further in Sec. V, is an essential enabler of
LEAVE. Each node uses its own sensory inputs (including
time and location), messages received from its neighbors
(assuming an honest majority), and a set of evaluation rules,
to classify safety messages received from a given node as
faulty or correct. Messages that are outdated (aged), received
beyond their expected area of propagation, or contradictory
to the node’s own state1 are considered false. Their senders,
as long as they are neighbors of the node running MDS, are
also tagged as misbehaving. Then, their identity is passed to
LEAVE.
The main principle of LEAVE, detailed in Sec. VI, is
simple: the neighbors of the misbehaving vehicle temporarily
“evict” it. In contrast to RTC and RC2RL, LEAVE is not a
revocation protocol, but rather a collective warning system
against misbehaving nodes. Upon detecting an attacker, vehi-
cles broadcast warning messages to all vehicles in range, so
that the sharing of information improves the effectiveness of
the stand-alone detection systems. Moreover, such warnings
can be invaluable when vehicles receive them before being
able to observe the misbehaving node themselves. We clarify
that the notion of neighborhood is different for MDS and
LEAVE. In the first case, it includes all one-hop neighbors
of the vehicle running the MDS. LEAVE, as further detailed
in Sec. VI-B, elects a subset of this neighborhood; this subset
depends on both the vehicle running the MDS and the attacker.
The eviction of an attacker by its neighbors is temporally
limited to the duration of contact between the attacker and
its neighbors running LEAVE. But once enough evidence
against the attacker is gathered, the CA can initiate one of the
previously described revocation protocols. Recall that the CA
is the only system entity entitled to revoke keys (due to all the
related administrative responsibilities and costs). In this paper,
we do not consider the CA decision process for node revoca-
tion, as a number of legal and policy aspects are involved. In
addition, the reasons for revocation are largely orthogonal to
the operation itself and can include administrative procedures
(e.g., change of registration domain), cryptographic material
compromise (e.g., a private key was detectably disclosed) or,
as mentioned above, node misbehavior for which the CA
obtains sufficient evidence.
IV. REVOCATION PROTOCOLS
A. Revocation of the Trusted Component (RTC)
When the CA decides to revoke a vehicle V , it first uses
RTC (Fig. 2): The CA generates a revocation message that
contains V ’s identity, encrypted with V ’s public key PuKV ,
and a timestamp T ; the message is signed by the CA. Thus,
TCV and the RSUs that forward the message can verify its
authenticity and freshness. The message format is:
CA
RSU→ TCV : EPuKV (V ), T, SigCA[EPuKV (V ), T ]
where EPuKV () denotes encryption with public key PuKV .
There are several options for channeling this message to the
TCV . The first choice would be to route it to the RSU closest
1For example, a traffic jam message received when the node’s velocity in
the allegedly jammed area is well above the velocity expected for a traffic
jam.
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Fig. 2. Revocation of the Trusted Component (RTC) and Revocation using
Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists (RC2RL).
to the concerned vehicle, if its location is known to the CA.
Otherwise the CA defines a paging area consisting of several
RSUs in the region of the vehicle’s most recent locations
(trajectory extrapolation based on the vehicle’s expected speed
and acceleration can be useful in determining the paging area).
If all else fails, the CA can use other distribution media
mentioned in Section II, such as low-speed radio broadcast.
When TCV receives the RTC message, it immediately
erases the cryptographic key and stops signing VN messages.
It sends back a timestamped and signed acknowledgment, as
soon as it comes within range of a RSU:
TCV
RSU→ CA : ACK, T, SigPrKV [ACK, T ]
If the vehicle V is an attacker capable of blocking messages
destined to its TC, the CA will receive no acknowledgement
and thus will detect the failure of RTC. It will then revert to
the RC2RL protocol discussed in the next subsection.
B. RC2RL (Revocation using Compressed Certificate Revoca-
tion Lists)
As CRLs contain very little redundancy, they cannot be
efficiently compressed using normal lossless methods. We
therefore use Bloom Filters [14], a special form of lossy com-
pression, to generate C2RLs (Compressed CRLs) that the CA
signs and broadcasts using one of the previously mentioned
distribution methods. Bloom filters provide a probabilistic data
structure used to test whether an element is a member of a
set. They are characterized by a configurable rate of false
positives and no false negatives. This ensures that the CA
can efficiently revoke all targeted nodes while keeping false
revocations within acceptable error margins. A more detailed
check known misbehaviors
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Fig. 3. Misbehavior Detection System (MDS) operation.
explanation of Bloom filters and their application to revocation
in VNs can be found in Appendix I.
V. MISBEHAVIOR DETECTION SYSTEM
As explained in Sec. II-A, it may be more beneficial for
the adversary in VNs to tamper with the data transferred by
protocols rather than with the protocols themselves. Hence, the
Misbehavior Detection System (MDS) should rely not only on
the protocol-specific actions of nodes but also on the data these
nodes provide. Similarly to Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
[15], we can distinguish between two types of misbehavior in
VNs:
1) Known misbehaviors that can be identified by monitor-
ing specific parameters of node or network behavior.
For example, several tests for position verification in
georouting protocols are proposed in [16].
2) Data anomalies that do not follow any known pattern.
This is often the case when the adversary modifies or
injects safety messages according to its specific needs.
Standard IDS techniques detect data anomalies by moni-
toring specific metrics, comparing the actual metric values to
expected values, and by thresholding the deviation to detect
attacks. In VNs, expected values often are not known in
advance and do not fit a given model. For example, the traffic
congestion varies considerably depending on the road and
the time of the day. A highly adaptive approach consists in
comparing the behavior of each node to the average behavior
of the other nodes (including the node running the MDS), thus
building data models on the fly. This can be done by one of
several methods proposed in the literature [15], [17]. Among
these methods, entropy, a typical measure of information,
emerges as an effective and efficient solution. Hence, we use
entropy to represent the anomalous and normal behaviors of
nodes and then compare them. More specifically, assume:
• n reporting nodes;
• pi is the probability that node i is an attacker (if all nodes
are well-behaving, then they can be attackers with the
same probability);
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Fig. 4. Performance of the MDS in the case of data anomalies.
• P0 is the probability density function of pi when there
are no attackers (i.e., it represents normal behavior);
• P is the probability density function of pi when there
are no attackers and the MDS tolerates mild faults up to
a given error margin .  defines the rate of false positives
and false negatives of the MDS.
The behavior of nodes can be represented by the entropy
H = −∑ni=1 pilog2pi. The MDS detects an attack (i.e.,
an anomaly) in the system if the corresponding attacker
probability density function has the following property:
D(P‖P0)
D(P‖P0) > R (1)
where D(P‖Q) is the Kullback-Leibler distance [18] be-
tween the two probability density functions P and Q; R is
the detection threshold for anomalous distance ratios.
As entropy alone only reflects the state of the system
without identifying the attackers, we use an outlier detection
algorithm [19] to single out the attackers. Among the possible
options, we use the K-means clustering algorithm [20] that
iteratively and efficiently converges to the number of clusters
that minimizes the sum of distances of all points to the
corresponding cluster centroids. Based on the above, the
operation of the MDS can be summarized as shown in Fig. 3.
A VN application determines the corresponding known
misbehaviors, the sample size n, the algorithm for computing
the pi values, the reference probability density functions P0
and P, and the detection threshold R; the choice of  and R
allows tuning the rates of false positives and false negatives.
We describe in detail an example application of the proposed
MDS below.
It should be noted that the MDS detects only nodes that
are in its current neighborhood, based on their locations and
timestamps. This limits the load of attacker detection to the
attacker’s neighbors. This way, the MDS does not distinguish
between data originators and data relays. In fact, a (relay) node
that propagates false data constitutes a vulnerable point and
needs to be contained.
A. Example Application of the MDS
In a typical VN application, a vehicle stopped on the
roadside emits warnings to alert other vehicles of an event
(e.g., an accident) that requires their action (e.g., to slow
down). These warnings (containing the location of the event)
are destined to all vehicles within a 1 km range. As the
typical range of DSRC is 300 m, intermediate vehicles need
to forward the warnings over several hops after verifying
and signing them (to prevent the uncontrolled propagation of
false information). We note that the position of the observing
vehicle does not change significantly during the execution time
of the MDS because all warnings are transmitted over the high-
speed DSRC and all computations are efficient2 and local.
We assume the attackers attempt, in their warnings, to report
the event at a position further from the warning recipients than
the actual one; this would prevent vehicles from braking in
time, thus causing accidents. Reporting a position closer than
the actual one would not cause accidents as vehicles would
brake anyway. We consider the case where the observing
vehicle is several hops away from the event but within the
1 km area covered by the warnings.
First, the observing vehicle computes the pi values cor-
responding to reporting vehicles as follows. Assuming that
the observing vehicle is at location (xo, yo) and that vehi-
cle i reports that the event/accident is at location (xe, ye)i,
the resulting computed distance from the event is di =
d[(xe, ye)i, (xo, yo)] where d denotes a distance function (e.g.,
Euclidean distance). Let qi be the ratio of di to the average of
the lower 50% of the reported distances (recall that attackers
only enlarge distances and we assume an honest majority).
Finally, pi = qi∑n
i=1
qi
is the probability that vehicle i is
an attacker. The MDS then applies the detection rule in
Equation 1. The reference probability density functions P0
and P are computed based on the sample size n and the
tolerable error margin . In this example, n is equal to the
2Assuming n neighbors, the approximation of entropy is upper-bounded
by O(no(1)logn) [21]; the complexity of K-means is O(n) [20].
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number of reports (about the specific event) received from
distinct neighbors.
Fig. 4(a) shows, in the case of 100 nodes and an error
margin of 10%, the performance of the MDS (represented
by the ratio defined in Equation 1) corresponding to different
percentages of attackers. Anomalous enlargement, by the
reporting vehicles, of the distance to the event is considered
as an attack. The detection threshold R (i.e., deviation ratio)
is set to 2 in this example; we selected this value empirically
to reduce false positives and false negatives. We can see that
the MDS can detect attacks, for a 30% enlargement, if the
percentage of attackers is between 5% and 91%.3 Attacker
percentages larger than 91% cannot be detected because they
strongly influence the reference values and thus define the
normal, although wrong, behavior. Fig. 4(b) shows the per-
centage of attackers detected by K-means clustering. We can
notice that the larger the percentage of excess (i.e., distance
enlargement), the easier it is to detect attackers. This is rather
intuitive and acceptable because mild abuse can in fact be
a small detection system error due to the highly dynamic
environment.
VI. THE LEAVE PROTOCOL
As mentioned in Section III, being warned of the mis-
behaving nodes allows the observing vehicle to ignore any
messages sent by these nodes. Warnings can be triggered by
the standalone MDSs running on each vehicle. This is the key
3We can notice that the assumption of an honest majority is not necessary
in this particular example. The reason is that, in this case, the criterion of an
attack is distance enlargement and not deviation from the majority.
concept behind LEAVE, illustrated in Fig. 5. More precisely,
vehicles that detect an attacker begin broadcasting warning
messages to all vehicles in range. The latter can use this
information as input to their respective MDSs. In this paper,
we consider the case of vehicles that receive warning messages
before they are able to make any observations of the attacker
and thus rely entirely on these messages. The final step is
to report the attackers or faulty nodes to the CA as soon as
possible (i.e., when in reach of a base station or mobile unit
as defined in Sec. II).
A. Neighbor Warning System for LEAVE
The warning system relies on the collective information
gathered from a vehicle’s neighborhood. As all vehicles can
be attackers with the same probability, the warning messages
may contain correct or wrong accusations. Given the limited
amount of available evidence, vehicles rely on the assumption
of honest majority and crosscheck all received accusations. In
this paper, we use a simple algorithm, explained in detail in
Appendix II.A, for summing accusations, with an additional
feature inspired by [22]: An accusation issued by a node has
a lower weight when this node is already accused by other
participants. If the sum of weighted accusations (the eviction
quotient) against a vehicle exceeds a defined threshold, it is
locally evicted by LEAVE. More precisely, warning messages
are transformed into disregard messages that instruct all the
neighbors of the attacker to ignore its messages.
It should be stressed here that this algorithm is only an
example and other accusation aggregation systems can be
devised. We chose this rather simple system because it requires
no setup overhead, as incentive systems do [23], nor long
observation periods needed by reputation systems [24]. In ad-
dition, it involves no interactive mechanisms, thus preventing
our system from being dependent on specific participants. As
stated earlier, the only requirement for the proposed neighbor
warning system to be effective is the existence of an honest
majority.
The difference between warning and disregard messages is
that a specific number of supporting signatures is included
by the sender in the disregard message, compared to only
one signature in the warning message. This increases the
credibility of the message, assuming an honest majority, while
maximizing channel efficiency by message aggregation [25].
A vehicle that accumulates enough accusations against an
attacker to reach the eviction threshold (its computation is
detailed in Appendix II.A) is called hereafter a warned vehicle.
An initially warned vehicle is a warned vehicle that disregards
all bogus messages from the attacker. This can happen if the
vehicle has already reached the warned state before receiving
the first message from the attacker (because it has received
enough accusations to reach the eviction threshold).
It should be noted that, although LEAVE relies on accusa-
tions by nodes, it is highly resilient to attackers as shown in
Appendix II.B.
B. Definition of the Attacker’s Neighborhood
The neighbor warning system, introduced in the previous
section, relies on the neighbors of a suspected vehicle (sus-
pect) to accuse it in case of misbehavior and warn other
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vehicles. Once these vehicles have enough information about
the suspect, they can evaluate whether it is misbehaving; we
refer to them as evaluators. Hence, it is important to define
the suspect’s neighborhood N . New vehicles coming into
the communication range of a suspected vehicle will use the
information provided by their neighbors to detect misbehavior.
It is essential here to avoid the problem whereby a vehicle that
is not in the suspect’s range, and hence cannot evaluate it, is
considered when making a decision (Fig. 6). Therefore, the
neighborhood N of a suspected vehicle also depends on the
vehicle evaluating it. We define N(s, e), where s and e refer
to suspect and evaluator, respectively, as the intersection of the
coverage areas (defined by the transmission range) of both the
suspected vehicle and the vehicle evaluating it. This way, we
ensure that all vehicles in N can receive messages from the
suspect, and thus potentially accuse it, while being able to
report their accusations to the evaluators.
It should be noted that an evaluator vehicle can select the
elements of N because all vehicles broadcast their position
information. The suspect’s position is reported in the warning
messages received by the evaluator.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of LEAVE
under stringent VN conditions. The following results show
that eviction of misbehaving nodes can be done efficiently. A
detailed performance analysis of the usage of Bloom filters
can be found in Appendix I.
As LEAVE relies on the ad hoc operation of vehicles within
short time delays, we simulate it using ns-2 with the MAC-
layer parameters of IEEE 802.11p. We consider three different
parameters in our evaluations. The first one is the traffic model:
we used a freeway (FW), a city (West University, or WU),
and a mixed (freeway/city) (Afton Oak, or AO) scenarios.4
The second and third factors are the density of vehicles and
their average speed, respectively. The presented results are the
average of 50 simulation runs. As the MDS runs locally on
each vehicle, its computational delay is small and hence not
critical for the system operation; in the simulations, we do
not include this delay. We place one adversary in the system,
but the same results apply to multiple adversaries, assuming
there is an honest majority (LEAVE runs separately for each
adversary).
A. Vehicle Density
In the WU and AO scenarios, for very low vehicle densities
the percentage of initially warned vehicles (Section VI-A)
is low (Fig. 7(a)). In this case, it is not possible to pass
information from one vehicle to another in a reliable way and
thus warn other vehicles before they encounter the adversary.
However, this percentage grows with increasing density and
stabilizes between 80% and 90%. Vehicles not initially warned
need less than 2 s to begin disregarding messages at high
densities (Fig. 7(b)). For the freeway scenario, there is a slight
decrease in performance at very high densities. This may be
4WU and AO are realistic scenarios taken from [26]. The framework used
for developing the simulations in this section is available at [27].
Neighbor not in N
Evaluator (example)
Suspect
Neighbor in N
N
Fig. 6. Definition of the attacker’s neighborhood.
explained by the fact that the number of packet collisions
increases when the density increases.
Overall, even with a relatively low density of VN-enabled
vehicles, which will be the case with a low market penetration
at the beginning of VN deployment, LEAVE is still able to
accumulate enough information to perform successfully within
the constraints imposed by short contact times (e.g., assuming
a transmission range of 300 m and two vehicles moving in
opposite directions on the same highway, each at an average
speed of 100 km/h, their contact time is merely around 11 s).
B. Average Speed
We evaluate the same metrics for different average speeds
in the three scenarios (Figs. 7(c) and 7(d)). In the urban areas
(AO and WU), we can see that higher speeds give better
results: again, because more participants can be contacted
in a given time interval, it is possible to accumulate more
accusations against the attacker and to warn other vehicles
(in these two cases, the maximum average speed is 90 km/h,
higher values are rare). In the freeway scenario, the average
speed is much higher, and performance decreases slightly for
very high speeds: this can be explained by the fact that contact
times becomes very short. In this case, some messages may
not be received, thus resulting in a slightly higher time to
reach the necessary threshold. Still, we can see that LEAVE
operates within acceptable delays and covers a considerable
percentage of concerned vehicles.
C. Effect of Warning Rebroadcast Interval
If a vehicle continues to receive bogus messages from the
attacker, it does not send warning messages continuously.
Rather, it repeats them once per a Warning Rebroadcast
Interval (WRI), as long as the attack persists. The WRI is used
to prevent vehicles from flooding the channel with accusation
messages, thus preventing DoS attacks based on excessive
channel load or on computation overhead (due to digitally
signing warning messages). However, if a vehicle sends a
warning message only once and then stops participating in
the warning process against a potential attacker, newly arriving
vehicles will not be able to accumulate enough accusations to
disregard the attacker’s messages. Hence, the parameter WRI
is a tradeoff between overhead (sending too often the same
warnings) and responsiveness to attackers (quickly informing
new neighbors about misbehaving vehicles).
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Fig. 7. System performance vs. vehicle density, average speed, WRI, and number of supporting signatures.
Changing the WRI has only a small effect on the percentage
of initially warned nodes in the case of low vehicle density
(Fig. 7(e)). In higher density situations we can observe a slight
increase of warned vehicles with smaller WRIs (i.e., when
sending accusations more frequently), but this also increases
channel load. As the results show, WRI can be set to a
high value (and thus incur low overhead) without significant
degradation in the performance of LEAVE.
D. Number of Supporting Signatures
The number of supporting signatures (Section VI-A) is a
parameter of LEAVE. It may be influenced by the signature
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size of the cryptographic system in use. But a minimum
number of signatures is required to ensure the credibility
of disregard messages. Fig. 7(f) shows that the number of
warned vehicles changes considerably with low numbers of
supporting signatures. But starting with only 4 signatures,
there is little change in the results. This can be explained
by the fact that, starting from this point, the redundancy of
supporting signatures increases.
To cope with the abuse of disregard messages, a vehicle
should still crosscheck several disregard messages and verify
that the total number of supporting signatures received in these
messages is larger than the majority of nodes in the neigh-
borhood N (assuming an honest majority). The advantage
of relying on small rather than large disregard messages is
smaller retransmission overhead if a collision happens on the
wireless channel.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Revocation has been considered mostly in the context of the
wireline Internet and the design of Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) services [9]. Nevertheless, the design of mechanisms to
disseminate the revocation information across systems similar
to VNs has not been considered in the wireline Internet context
(for a survey and discussion of tradeoffs see [28], [29]). Due
to the network volatility and scale, the overhead of querying
a server to obtain timely revocation status, assuming the
server is reachable, could be impractically high. For the same
reasons, schemes that distribute the load of a server to a set
of participating clients [30] (to redundantly forward revocation
information) would not be practical for deployment within the
VN, but only meaningful behind the fixed infrastructure.
Existing works on VN security [2], [8], [10], [31] propose
the use of a PKI and digital signatures but do not provide
any mechanisms for certificate revocation, even though it is
a required component of any PKI-based solution. Different
aspects of revocation were discussed in [7], [32], [33] without
a complete solution provided. In the context of VNs, the
IEEE 1609.2 Draft Standard [4] is the only reference on
certificate revocation. It proposes the distribution of CRLs and
short-lived certificates, but does not elaborate how to achieve
this. Short-lived certificates are also proposed in [6]. Short
lifetimes are essentially a means of revocation that achieves
efficiency but opens a vulnerability window; such an approach
is not appropriate for a life-critical VN environment.5 More-
over, certificates have to be refreshed frequently to keep the
vulnerability window very small. This could create high loads
both on the CA and the network.
The literature on VNs already contains methods for adver-
sary detection. For example, threshold-based tests to verify
positioning information in VNs were proposed in [16]. In
[13], a more general framework for malicious data detection
compares the received data to a model of the VN; but the paper
provides no details on possible tests.
The application of information-theoretic measures to
anomaly detection was previously studied in the literature [34],
5An exception can be context-specific credentials, allocated, for example,
to a vehicle entering a highway segment and “purchasing” access to a service.
However, this is orthogonal to the problem we are considering here.
[35], [36], but mainly in the context of the wired Internet. Most
notably, [36] successfully applied the notion of relative entropy
(also known as the Kullback-Leibler distance) to measure the
similarity between two datasets.
Instantiating a CA in the context of mobile ad hoc networks
was investigated, with the distribution of its functionality to
a number of servers [37]. However, this scheme does not
consider the problem of revocation, especially in a highly
mobile environment like a VN. Instantiation of the CA
functionality (or part thereof) by impromptu coalitions of
network nodes (e.g., [22], [38]) cannot be applicable in VN
systems. Allowing any ad hoc and, in general, small subset of
adversarial nodes to maliciously accuse and revoke legitimate
nodes would be an unacceptable breach of the VN system
security where accountability and liability are mandatory.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a framework to thwart internal
attackers in vehicular networks. The eviction of faulty or
attacking nodes is crucial to the robustness of vehicular
communication systems. As revocation is the primary means
to achieve this, we designed two protocols tailored to the
characteristics of the VN environment. To eliminate the vul-
nerability window, due to the latency for the authority to
identify faulty or misbehaving nodes and distribute revocation
information, we designed a scheme that can robustly and
efficiently achieve their isolation, as well as contribute to
their eventual revocation. This is done with the help of
a misbehavior detection module and a distributed eviction
protocol. Given the broad scope of the subject tackled in this
paper, there is ample space for future work on each of the
individual components of our framework. Nonetheless, our
results evaluating the instantiation proposed in this paper show
that our scheme is practical, efficient, and effective in isolating
misbehaving and faulty nodes.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank Paul Drielsma, Virgil D. Gligor,
Marcin Poturalski, Patrick Schaller and the anonymous re-
viewers for their helpful feedback on earlier versions of this
work.
APPENDIX I: BLOOM FILTERS
A Bloom filter, illustrated in Fig. 8, consists of a m-bit
vector with all its bits initially set to zero. An element (a
public key in our context) can be included in the filter by
(i) hashing it with k independent hash functions that output
numbers in the range 1, . . . ,m, and (ii) setting to 1 the vector
bit each hash function points to. It is possible that one bit is set
to 1 multiple times due to the addition of several elements. To
check if a given element is contained in the filter, the element
is hashed and the corresponding filter bits are checked: If at
least one of those bits is zero, the element is not contained
in the filter. Otherwise, if all necessary k bits are set, the
element is included with high probability. The corresponding
bit could have been set also due to multiple additions of other
elements. The more elements added, the larger the probability
of false positives. In the context of revocation by C2RLs, the
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Fig. 8. Bloom filter concept.
nodes validate the certificates included in received messages
by checking the Bloom filter. We discuss quantitative aspects
of Bloom filters in the next section.
A. Bloom Filter Performance
Bloom filters provide a compression tool with configurable
compression gain (c) and false positives rate (pfp). The
configurable parameters of the filter are:
• The filter vector size m.
• The number of hash functions k.
An additional input, however not configurable, is the num-
ber of list entries (certificate IDs) L, each considered to be l
bits long.
A large value of m considerably reduces the false positives
rate pfp = (1 − (1 − 1/m)kL)k ≈ (1 − e−kL/m)k, at the
cost of decreasing the compression gain c = L × l/m. The
choice of m can be derived from Fig. 9(a), where the number
of hash functions k is chosen to be optimal (ln(2) × m/n,
when dpfp/dk = 0). Taking also into consideration the range
of the number of list entries L, we choose m = 20 KBytes,
transmittable over the considered radio channels within short
time limits (e.g., around 27 ms over a 6 Mbps DRSC channel).
The choice of the optimal number of hash functions k
improves the efficiency, at the cost of increased system com-
plexity. In fact, to use a variable number of hash functions,
the CA must transmit the used value of k together with the
filter. At the receiving side, the verifier must learn k and use
k entries of a pre-established list of hash functions.
To avoid this complexity, we use a fixed number of hash
functions k. Fig. 9(b) shows the case where k = 10 (for m =
20 KBytes), a compromise between computation complexity
and false positives rate. We can see that the resulting false
positives rate is reasonably low for small n and converges
to the performance provided by optimal values of k when n
increases. As the for the considerably high compression gain
c (10 < c < 138), it is independent of the number of hash
functions k (whether fixed or variable/optimal).
APPENDIX II: DETAILS OF LEAVE
B. Computation of the Eviction Quotient
An observing vehicle uses the following parameters to
calculate the eviction quotient for vehicle j (with accusations
from different vehicles i):
• Ai is the total number of accusations (issued by different
vehicles) against vehicle i. Ai is used to reduce the
weight (i.e., credibility) of the accusations made by
vehicle i if it was already accused.
• Pi is the accumulated sum of |Ni|, the number of i’s
neighbors (as explained in Sec. VI-B) that the observing
vehicle has encountered.
• αi is the normalized value of the total number of ac-
cusations with respect to the total number of neighbors
of vehicle i (0 ≤ αi ≤ 1). This value is computed as
follows: αi = AiPi .
• ωi is the weight of any accusation made by vehicle i.
This weight depends on the number of accusations made
against i: ωi = 1−αi, giving 0 ≤ ωi ≤ 1. Therefore, the
weight of a node against which there are no accusations
equals 1.
• Qj is the eviction quotient defining whether vehicle j
should be evicted. It is computed as follows: Qj =
1
Pj
(
∑Pj
i=1 σijωi), where σij = 1 if there is an accusation
against j issued by i, and σij = 0 otherwise.
The eviction quotient threshold (QT ) is a configurable
parameter. A typical value would be 0.5 (majority voting).
If Qj > QT , vehicle j’s messages are disregarded.
C. Resilience to Attackers
As LEAVE relies on nodes accusing attackers, there is a
potential for abuse by attackers: A group of colluding attackers
can accuse honest nodes and cause their eviction. In this
section, we analyze LEAVE’s resilience to such attacks. As-
suming all nodes have roughly the same number of neighbors,
Pj ≈ P , the eviction quotient becomes Qj = 1P
∑P
i=1 σijωi.
Let x be the fraction of attackers in the neighborhood. We can
distinguish two cases:
Case 1: Attackers accuse all honest nodes; honest nodes do
not accuse attackers. We consider this to be a strong attacker
case. The eviction quotient required for a successful attack is:
Q =
1
P
xP∑
i=1
1 = x (2)
Case 2: Attackers accuse all honest nodes; honest nodes
accuse all attackers. We consider this to be a weak attacker
case. The eviction quotient required for a successful attack is:
Q =
1
P
xP∑
i=1
(1− P − xP
P
) = x2 (3)
Fig. 10 shows the required percentage of attackers for a
successful attack, given an eviction threshold of 0.5. We can
see that, under the assumption of honest majority, LEAVE is
highly resilient to colluding accusers.
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